Abstract
the weight of international opinion, domestic veto players update their prior beliefs 23 (cf. Igoe Walsh, 2007) , and may eventually ratify a treaty that they would not 24 have otherwise accepted -if, for example, the same policy had been proposed as 25 1 In some cases (e.g. protocols and amendment instruments) states may accede, succeed, approve or accept a treaty without signing it. Ratification implies that an international agreement is binding (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Art. 2(1b) ). Signature, on the other hand, only commits a state "to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and the purpose of the treaty" (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Art. 18a) part of domestic legislation. Just as the expertise of US Congressional committees how treaties can facilitate cooperation between states. But we argue that it is by no 23 means the whole story, and that it neglects interactions between the international 24 and domestic levels that are important for securing domestic actors' consent for 25 2 In practice the distinction between commitment and signaling may be blurred in relation to any particular institutional practice (Slantchev, 2005) . international cooperation.
1
There is some informal discussion of signaling to domestic actors.
3 In the do- 4 Our model could be extended to demonstrate how both signing and ratification disclose information through time.
simply provide our theoretical assumptions and results. We highlight why inter-1 national action may succeed where purely domestic action would be vetoed; and 2 clarify when signing is (and is not) informative to veto players.
3
To recap, we argue that political executives must persuade domestic veto play-4 ers of the importance of policy action on an issue, whether by participating in However, if executives from many countries simultaneously sign a treaty, then this 10 can potentially provide a stronger signal: not just one, but many actors believe 11 that action is important. This stronger signal can persuade domestic vetoes to 12 support policy change.
13
First we assume that policy is complex and political actors' cognitive resources 14 are limited: therefore, there is uncertainty about the effect of policy action. In 15 particular, we focus on a single binary policy which is aimed at addressing an 16 issue; with some probability, the policy will be beneficial to states that introduce 17 it; otherwise, the policy will bring no benefit but only costs. Policy makers are 18 uncertain what the true state of affairs is. We make no distinction between the 19 seriousness of the issue and the efficacy of the policy: policy makers may either 20 be uncertain whether the underlying issue is serious, or whether the policy is 21 appropriate to address an issue which is known to be serious. not get a signal, but the weaker condition that they do not already know all the 13 information known by all executives worldwide, and can therefore be persuaded 14 by that information and by actions which signal it.
15
We also assume that executives from different countries have different levels 16 of expertise. Executives from developed countries with high levels of scientific 17 expertise will be more informed about the policy's effects than those from coun-18 tries with a weak scientific base; countries deeply affected by a particular issue, 19 such as fisheries policy for countries with a large fishing industry, will have more 20 expert executives than unaffected countries; and countries with long experience 21 of environmental treaty implementation will have more knowledge and expertise 22 available than countries with less experience.
23
Our model explicitly assumes away any policy interdependencies across states: 24 the benefit of the policy in a given country is independent of whether other coun-25 tries introduce the policy. To be clear, we believe that treaty ratification typically 26 does involve international externalities (Axelrod and Keohane, 1985) . However,
27
our assumption allows us to show that our signaling rationale for treaty signature 28 exists even in the absence of other, more substantive policy reasons for coordi-1 nated action, such as externalities. Below, we argue that relaxing the assumption 2 of independent policy benefits would further strengthen the signaling rationale for 3 treaty signature.
4
Lastly, our game form embodies assumptions about the politics of the treaty 5 process. After a state's executive (or her diplomatic representatives) has signed, 6 the treaty is submitted for ratification. Then each domestic veto players decides 7 whether to allow ratification of the treaty having observed which other executives 8 have signed it. Since any veto player (by definition) can block action, it is a 9 country's most skeptical veto player that must be convinced. For expositional 10 brevity we sometimes call this player "the legislature", but nothing hangs on this.
11
The domestic legislation and international treaty routes involve different knowl-12 edge conditions. The treaty route involves a public signing event in which many 13 countries participate. This makes countries' commitment visible to domestic veto 14 players, via e.g. reports in the media. For example, climate change agreements 15 have received considerable media attention (Schmidt, Ivanova and Schäfer, 2013) .
16
By contrast, if domestic legislation is introduced, we assume that domestic veto 17 players do not observe action in other countries -a strong assumption, but one 18 which captures the direction of the difference we expect.
19
Note that both signing a treaty and introducing domestic legislation are more 20 than just "cheap talk". Both actions have real effects, in that they can lead to 21 legislation being implemented. A country's executive will only take either action 22 if it genuinely believes that legislation is necessary. Technically, introducing legislation that you believe to be harmful is a weakly dominated action.
Under the above assumptions, an executive which introduces domestic legisla-1 tion will pass it only if its own expertise is enough to convince the country's most 2 skeptical veto. An executive with a very strong preference for action -strong 3 enough that it always prefers legislation to pass, whether or not its private infor-4 mation indicates that the policy is appropriate -will not be able to credibly signal 5 information to domestic audiences. Even a more neutral executive may simply 6 lack enough expertise to persuade domestic vetoes that the policy is appropriate. , 1996) . However, we show computationally in Appendix B that in 13 general the strength of the signal is highly correlated with the sum of the expertise 14 of all signatories. This result leads us to our main hypothesis.
15
The likelihood of a legislature ratifying a treaty increases with the summed 16 expertise of the signatory countries.
17
Next, consider the effect of an increase in the number of domestic veto play-18 ers. Recall that the relevant actor is the most skeptical veto player in a country.
19
Suppose that the number of veto players in this country increases by one. Clearly with the number of other countries that do so. Now, there will be two benefits 2 to taking the treaty route, compared to introducing legislation on a country-by-3 country basis. First, the signal of expertise will be stronger, as before. Second, 4 this stronger signal will lead each country to expect more other countries to ratify 5 the treaty. This will encourage the country to ratify, which in turn will encour-6 age other countries, and so on. Thus, with positive externalities, the information 7 benefits of treaties, and the marginal effect of signatories' expertise, are likely to 8 increase.
9
The model assumes that treaty signature is costless, and its only effect is to 10 allow the country's legislature to ratify the treaty. Both these assumptions are 11 challengeable. Failure to pass a treaty, after a highly-publicized signing process,
12
can cause audience costs for executives, both with the international community as ratifying, then signing a treaty is pure "cheap talk" and can convey nothing.
18
On the other hand, audience costs of signing a treaty may serve to demonstrate 19 the executive's belief that the policy is appropriate, in line with a costly signaling 20 logic. Then, treaty signature may convey useful information even if it does not 21 affect the legislature's ability to accede or ratify.
22
Lastly, we assume that the content of the treaty is fixed at the start of the 23 game. In fact, we know that treaty content is negotiated with one eye on domestic 24 veto players (Putnam, 1988; Mo, 1995; Brown and Urpelainen, 2015) . Moreover, 25 domestic vetoes may pre-empt the treaty from reaching the international agenda at 26 all, if it takes certain specific forms to which they are opposed (Barrett, 2003: 148) .
27
This complicates the analysis, since now not only the set of signing executives, but 28 also the content of the treaty itself, might convey information to domestic vetoes.
1
One way of thinking about this is that in the existing setup, executives choose 2 between signing the treaty, and signing no treaty. A more complex model would 3 allow a range of possible treaties, taking weaker or stronger measures to deal 4 with the underlying issue, with executives negotiating to find a treaty that all are 5 willing to sign (including a possible "null" treaty that takes no meaningful action).
6
Legislatures would then observe the treaty signature and choose whether to ratify.
7
We believe that in such a more complex model, our basic insight would still and ratification, we study only treaties that require two separate approval steps,
22
signature and ratification, and exclude treaties which lack an explicit signature step
23
-protocols and amendments in particular. This leaves us with 126 environmental 24 treaties which require both signature and ratification.
25
6 We thank these authors for making their data available to us.
Finally, while the data set includes environmental treaties, some of the treaties 1 are not narrowly environmental in focus, but are also concerned with other issues 2 (e.g. the Aarhus Convention touches upon human rights). This does not present 3 a problem for us as our argument is not restricted to any substantive domain.
4
However, we account for treaty heterogeneity by stratifying our models for issue 5 areas of treaties (see Robustness checks).
6
To study ratification data, we use event history analysis. Event history anal-7 ysis is particularly suited to study the change in status from non-ratification to 8 ratification of a given treaty. It not only considers which states ratify a treaty, but 9 also takes into account the time lapse until ratification occurs. Moreover, event
10
history analysis accounts for the fact that observed data is incomplete. Soviet Union), since these states enter late into the database.
19
Another important feature of the event history method is its applicability to 20 data with "multiple events per subject" (Therneau and Grambsch, 2000) . We by "status" equaling 1), resulting in a varying length of the count for any country-3 treaty.
8 Table 1 illustrates the count structure of our ratification data in more 4 detail, providing also examples for right-censoring and left-truncation. are more likely to be convinced of the desirability of this action.
18
To test this claim, we first need to operationalize the group of initial signatories.
19
For each of the treaties in our sample we coded when states signed the treaty, if 20 9 Since we excluded protocols and amendments which are contingent on ratification of an earlier treaty from our data set, we do not compromise this conditional independence assumption.
10 The clustering function is used in the context of survival models to account for intra-group correlations. It is thus similar to fixed effects, but does not yield additional fixed effects parameters.
11 The likelihood is approximated by the Efron method which is particularly accurate in dealing with tied data.
12 The Cox model is characterized by an unspecified baseline hazard function. The unspecified baseline allows the hazard function to vary with time, and thus is able to capture potential time trends.
13 The hazard ratio must be independent of time. Results based on scaled Schoenfeld residuals indicate that this proportional hazards assumption is satisfied by all covariates. Model checks and data diagnostics are available from the authors on request. in the first year after opening for adoption. We therefore define states that sign 7 within the first year as "first signers" of a treaty, for which the binary variable 8 first sign is 1 and 0 otherwise. Next, we need to measure our main explanatory variable -states' knowledge of 10 environmental issues, which is a challenge. We develop four alternative measures.
11
The most direct measure of a country's environmental expertise is its research 12 output in this discipline. SCImago (2015) provides several measures of countries' 14 For each treaty we summed across the group of first signers the number 
20
Although the variable provides a good measure of environmental-science output,
21
unfortunately its temporal coverage is quite limited, starting in 1996.
22
For each treaty we summed across the group of first signers the number of 23 patents lodged by each country in the year of first signing (World Bank, 2015) .
This patent variable is denoted by patent i sign and is standardized to avoid 25 14 We considered weighting for citations, but such weightings are somewhat contentious and it made little difference to docs i sign.
15 Where data on patents was missing for some country years we linearly interpolated. Some poorer and smaller states never report. In all likelihood they produce very few patentable ideas; so we treated such cases as zeros. 16 As before, the variable is then 15 summed over the group of first signers for a given treaty.
16
Finally, we also test for issue-specific knowledge focusing on a narrower do- We also control in our models for obvious confounders. Because the number 1 of patents might just capture the general international influence of wealthy coun-2 tries, not something specific about their knowledgeability, we constructed a control 3 variable wealth i sign reflecting the wealth of first signers. Similarly, because 4 countries that produce many patents tend to be large and powerful, a country's 5 number of patents might be associated with its power position in the international 6 system. To control for this correlation we constructed power i sign. Both vari- 
12
As shown in 
Results

1
In Table 4 we present four models. All models test our hypothesis regarding 2 the effect of signatory countries' pooled expertise on the likelihood of a state 3 ratifying a treaty, using our alternative measures of expertise. In all models we 4 include the controls introduced above. Given that the controls do not show any 5 unexpected directions of effects, we focus here on the interpretation of our key 6 explanatory variables -patent i sign, experience i sign and marine i sign.
7
In Appendix C, Table 6 we also present equivalent models without the controls 8 (except for first sign, and r coast land in models including marine i sign).
9
Overall, the coefficient values and significance levels were reasonably stable across 10 the reduced and full variants of all our models. To check whether the effect of pooled expertise is conditioned by the importance of countries at the negotiation stage, we interacted our main variables with the number of countries' signatures and also controlled our models for the number of countries' signatures. However, the inclusion of both terms did not make any substantive difference to our results. 1972-2000 1972-2000 1972-2000 1972-2000 is statistically significant at a .001 level.
13
In model 3, we test the effect of issue-specific knowledge with marine i sign.
14 Though the treaties we deal with cover quite diverse environmental issues, around
15
50% of them concern maritime issues and fishing. States with extensive coastlines 16 are likely to have more knowledge and expertise on these issues than predomi-17 nantly landlocked states. We fit model 3 for a subsample of marine and fishing 18 treaties. We include marine i sign (the sum of signatories' marine-related ex-19 pertise, as proxied by their coast-land ratio), and, in addition to the previous 20 controls, a measure for a state's own coastline to land area ratio, r coast land.
21
For both variables we found significant and positive effects, although the effect 22 for marine i sign is statistically stronger than for r coast land (which is sta-23 tistically significant only at a .05 level). Thus, when it comes to issue-specific 24 knowledge there is also evidence for the pooled expertise effect.
25
Finally, in model 4 we also tested whether the effect of pooled expertise mea- Table 7 ).
(wealth i sign) and the power position of first signers (power i sign). Again, 1 we find a significant and positive effect for pooled expertise increasing the ratifica-2 tion likelihood by 15% (given a one standard deviation increases in the variable). To confirm our results regarding the effect of signatories' expertise on ratification,
5
we conducted several robustness checks and fitted numerous models, which we 6 show in Appendix C.
7
First, because our modeling framework involving multiple events is quite com- 
16
Second, the Cox proportional hazards models in Table 4 Results for patent i sign in Model A4 (Appendix C, Table 6 ) are not robust to the inclusion of wealth i sign and power i sign when all other controls are excluded. Such a fit obscures the effect of patent i sign as it gives much more exposure to the high level of correlation between these three variables (see Table 2 ).
indicating that our major results hold across different areas of environmental reg-1 ulation (Model 1 stratified on issues is shown in Appendix C, Table 7 ).
2 Third, to account for potential correlation of ratifications patterns by treaty 3 rather than country we refitted all our models with a cluster on "treaties". Cluster-4 ing our observation on treaties, however, does not alter our major result for pooled 5 expertise. In Appendix C, Table 7 we present Model 1 clustered on treaties.
6 Fourth, we also refitted models from Table 4 including the full set of controls, 7 controlling for regime type with polity2 rather than meanpc. All those estima-8 tions confirm the major findings presented in Table 4 , and do not alter our results 9 in any substantial way (see Appendix C, Table 7 ).
10
Finally, we estimated several models to examine whether an increase in the 11 number of domestic veto players alters the effect of pooled expertise on states' 12 propensity to ratify. Although our theory does not make a directional prediction
13
for domestic constraints, we tested empirically for the interaction between expertise 14 and veto players, measured as the level of constraint on the executive.
22 However,
15
we did not find a substantively important effect of domestic constraints in either 16 direction.
17
Conclusion
18
We argue that the signing of treaties is more than a political ritual. Our theory
19
predicts that the greater the weight of international opinion signaled by initial 20 signatories, the greater the chance that the treaty will subsequently be ratified.
21
Our theory highlights a non-obvious reason for choosing an international treaty 22 over domestic legislation: international treaties may sway domestic veto players if 23 22 To measure domestic veto structure, we used the executive constraint variable from the Polity project (xconst) (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2014) . Second, to specifically reflect environmental concerns, we calculate a score reflecting the position of the median member's party on environmental issues (env leg) using the Comparative Manifestoes Project information on the emphasis placed on the environment in parties' election manifestoes (Klingemann et al., 2006 and benefits of legislative action differently; however, we assume c J i ∈ (0, 1), so 11 that all actors will prefer to legislate if and only if the probability of the policy 12 being appropriate is above some threshold.
13
Information
14
Each executive receives a private signal S i ∈ {0, 1} where S i = S with probability 
17
For actor J in country i, let
This is the logged, risk-adjusted "cost-benefit ratio" as J sees things before his 18 prior beliefs, s, are updated. Note that K Ji > 0 if and only if s − c Ji < 0, which 19 means that the actor is an ex ante "sceptic" who would not pass legislation in the 20 absence of positive evidence that the policy is appropriate.
21
Let α i be executive i's logged odds of an accurate signal, or "expertise" for short:
Since π i > 1/2, α i is positive. Suppose any actor has belief µ that the policy is appropriate. Then he will wish to pass legislation if
A little algebra transforms this into
By Bayes' rule, for any signal S i ,
and transforming to odds and taking logs:
Similarly P rob(S = 1|S i = 0) = −α Ji + log s 1−s . Hence an executive will wish to implement the policy, conditional on his own positive signal, if α i ≥ K Ei ; and conditional on his own negative signal, if
24 This additive logic extends to multiple signals: conditional on any number of observed or inferred signals, player J in country i will wish to implement the policy if
Adoption of domestic legislation 1
To show the signaling advantages of the treaty route over domestic legislation, 2 we first model the introduction of domestic legislation to implement the policy.
3
Recall that the standard advantages of international treaties (e.g. coordinated We assume that without the publicity afforded by the negotiation process, no 
12
The executive has three pure strategies: ALWAYS propose legislation, NEVER
13
propose, or CONDITION on her signal i.e. propose iff S E = 1. We rule out the 14 fourth strategy, proposing if and only if her signal is 0, as weakly dominated.
15
We also assume that, even if the legislature always rejects, the executive will Table 5 shows the conditions for each pair of possible strategies to be in equilib- or NEVER, then the legislature assumes after a proposal that the executive re- ceived S E = 1. 
Therefore, in an equilibrium where the treaty is tabled, recalling that this 3 requires unanimity, each executive's best strategy is:
CONDITION if j∈Q∪R,j =i
NEVER if j∈Q∪R,j =i α j + α i < K Ei .
The legislature in country i will then ratify in such an equilibrium if and only
An equilibrium requires sets Q and R satisfying the appropriate condition two executives condition on their signal, and the other always signs. This is a 5 typical example of the "swing voter's curse" (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996), 6 where conditional on the other two executives signing, the third executive wishes 7 to sign irrespective of his or her own signal. We examine the effect of the swing 8 voter's curse below, by simulating equilibria.
9
To examine the effect of an increase in the number of veto players in country i, it never ratifies.
14 (e) K Li < A < A < K Li .
15
(f) A < K Li . In both these cases there is again no marginal effect, since country 16 i is either persuaded at both levels of expertise or at neither. ever, in our empirics we only observe which states sign a treaty, and not whether 5 they were conditioning (or more broadly, how much information is conveyed by 6 their signature).
7
To check whether this makes a difference, we simulated equilibria for different 8 numbers of states and random draws of α and κ terms. We discarded cases where 9 there was no pure strategy equilibrium. We also discarded cases where the only 10 pure strategy equilibrium had one or more states never signing, since these equi-
11
libria are not observable in our dataset. We ran simulations until we had 100 valid 12 draws, for 3, 5, 8 and 15 states. We then correlated the total sum of α terms of all 13 signers, with the total sum of α terms of signers who were conditioning. Results
14
are shown below. The correlation was strong and significant for all numbers of 15 states, though the correlation is smaller as n increases. Thus, the total knowledge
16
of signing states appears to be a good proxy for the real causal variable in our 17 theory, the total knowledge of signers who are conditioning. Table 4 .
Note: The figure reports estimates of coefficient values, not hazard ratios.
